We study incumbency advantage in platform industries, where the utility of participating in a platform is increasing in the mass of users participating in that platform. Individuals receive stochastic opportunities to migrate from an incumbent to a new (entrant) platform, which they can accept or wait until the next opportunity arises. Individuals have an incentive to delay migration until enough other users have migrated, which provides a micro-foundation for incumbency advantage.
Introduction
The utility of joining a telecommunications or social media platform, choosing a game console, or adopting an industry standard depends on who else has joined the platform, plays the same game, or uses the same standard. Users choose which platform to use, game to purchase, or standards to adopt on the basis of their predictions of how many users will make the same choices.
Economists and practitioners generally believe that competition in such industries is biased in favor of incumbents users are unlikely to migrate from incumbent to entrant platforms, even when the latter oers a superior product or services. 2 that provides a large number of tools, in particular collaboration tools, for developers. Some of the projects developed on GitHub involve collaboration within closed teams, but it is especially popular in the Open Source community. The European Commission's examination of the merger focused on the fear that Microsoft would degrade the quality of the platform, in particular by favoring its own technologies network externalities would discourage developers to migrate to a competing platform in response to this decrease in quality. We are in no way privy to the discussions between the regulators and the parties, but one can imagine that the discussion went something as follows.
regulator: Once you have acquired GitHub, you will favor your products and services in a way which will degrade its quality. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6155_en.htm, https://usefyi. com/github-history/, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-03/ open-source-great-satan-no-more-microsoft-wins-over-skeptics, https://www. theverge.com/2018/6/18/17474284/microsoft-github-acquisition-developer-reaction.
2 Actually, repositories. For discussion, see https://help.github.com/en/articles/ about-repositories. microsoft: Seriously, we would understand your concerns in a social networking platform where the users are reluctant to migrate for fear of losing their social groups. The GitHub users are sophisticated and well aware of the alternatives for collaborative work and will switch to one of them very fast if we degrade the platform.
The fact that developers are sophisticated and belong to a tight community may mitigate the fear that Microsoft would degrade the platform and Microsoft's analysis was accepted by European competition authorities.
However, to the best of our knowledge there is nothing in the economic literature that would have allowed the Commission to conduct a more formal analysis of the argument. We come back to the Microsoft purchase of GitHub in section 5 and in the conclusion and show how our model provides a rst step in that direction.
More generally, there has been very little formal exploration, whether empirical or theoretical, of the sources and size of incumbency advantage caused by network externalities, 3 despite the fact that the topic is both economically important and intellectually challenging. Indeed, network externalities cause incumbency advantage only if consumers have diculties coordinating on migration to better networks, whereas economists generally assume that, given a choice, players coordinate on the solution for which there exist a consensus that it is superior selecting the Pareto optimal equilibrium is standard practice, and often done without further explanation.
The aim of this paper is to test the coherence of the following argument, which we believe could contribute to our understanding of incumbency advantage: even if every consumer would prefer a collective migration from an incumbent platform to an entrant, they each would prefer enough of the others to migrate rst, in order not to spend time after migration alone on the new platform. In this sense, the consumers in our world are similar to a group of consumers on the sidewalk of a busy street with trac at close to standstill. They know that they can safely cross en masse, but each would prefer another one to step on the road rst, and they keep on waiting.
In order to conduct the analysis, we use a model in the same spirit as Farrell and Saloner (1985) , but, instead of assuming, as they do, that users face a once and for all migrate or stay put choice, we give them additional 3 There is, however, an extensive literature on some other causes of incumbency advantage, such as, for instance, learning by doing and switching costs. opportunities to migrate after declining one. This yields very dierent dynamics and generates incumbency advantage even when they predict that there would not be any. Much of this article discusses how the stochastic process generating migration opportunities (i.e., the migration technology ) inuences the existence of an equilibrium with migration. We identify the circumstances under which, like the pedestrians waiting for another one to go rst, users all keep using the incumbent because none want to migrate rst. Accepting early migration opportunities implies foregoing some of the value of the incumbent platform when it still has many users, and no one is willing to prime the pump. As far as we know, this is the rst paper to investigate this free rider problem, and indeed we prove that the incumbency advantage is greater when users have multiple migration opportunities than when they have only one (Proposition 4).
Before providing a road map for the paper, let us be more explicit about the question which we are asking. We do not attempt to solve the problem of multiplicity of equilibria which arise from network externalities because of the interdependence of user choices. Rather, we assume that user beliefs are favourable to migration. We then identify circumstances under which, conditional on these beliefs, migration can occur as an equilibrium. This is equivalent to identifying the circumstances under which there can be no migration, whatever the beliefs of agents. More economically, we show how the migration technology itself, rather than the beliefs of agents, can impede migration to a superior platform.
After a discussion of the literature in section 2, in section 3.1 we study the strategy of a single individual deciding whether to accept opportunities to migrate from an incumbent platform whose value is decreasing over time to an entrant platform whose value is increasing. We show that under very general circumstances she will use a threshold strategy, accepting all opportunities to migrate after a cuto time. In section 3.2, we embed the individual's problem in an equilibrium model and study the existence of a migration equilibrium, whose consequences we begin exploring in the remainder of section 3. We show that incumbency advantage is higher when users have multiple rather than a single opportunity to migrate. We also show that, for low discount rates, incumbency advantage is invariant to the speed of the migration technology, and only depends on its shape.
In section 4, we explore in more detail the characteristics of migration technology that aect the size of the incumbency advantage. For instance, we show that coordination in migration increases incumbency advantage.
In section 5, we examine a more parameterised setting where opportunities to migrate arise according to a combination of two natural and easily interpretable processes: a word of mouth process, where opportunities to migrate arise when a user meets another user who has already migrated; and an autonomous process, where opportunities to migrate arise at a constant rate, as might be induced by advertising. This formulation provides a micro foundation for the Bass diusion model, one of the workhorses of the marketing literature (see Bass, 1969 Bass, , 2004 , among many others). We show that, when word of mouth is the dominant process, migration only occurs when users prefer to be alone on the entrant platform to sharing the the incumbent platform with all the other users, i.e., when it is a dominant strategy to migrate. When the autonomous component dominates, there can be excessive or insucient migration.
In section 6, we extend our basic model to explore institutional features that can aect incumbency advantage. In 6.1, we show that incumbency advantage increases when users receive subsequent migration opportunities faster than the rst one (for instance because users become more aware of the existence of the entrant platform). In 6.2, we show that the entrant can decrease incumbency advantage by committing to a capacity constraint, so that not all users can join it. In 6.3, we show that the possibility of multi-homing decreases, but does not eliminate, incumbency advantage. This provides some support to the policy recommendations that competition authorities should pay special attention to practices that hinder multi-homing (see Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer, 2019) .
While most of this article focusses on the case of homogenous consumers, in section 7 we examine the consequences of heterogeneity between consumers. We show that there can exist a staggered migration equilibrium where, initially, only those users who nd the entrant platform most attractive migrate, while others wait until enough users have joined the entrant. If user preferences are suciently polarised, there exists an equilibrium where the dierent types of users settle on dierent platforms, which can be inefcient since it reduces the total amount of network externalities generated.
Conclusions and future research are presented in section 8.
Literature Review
There has been very little formal exploration, whether empirical or theoretical, of the sources and size of incumbency advantage caused by network externalities. This is puzzling as it contradicts standard assumptions: generally, economists believe that, given a choice, players in a game coordinate on the solution for which there exist a consensus that it is superior. Indeed, in the rst of the few articles which explore the theory of incumbency advantage, Farrell and Saloner (1985) predict that a nite number of users choosing sequentially will always nd a way to coordinate on a superior platform. Their argument is simple: the last consumer who is given the choice to join the (Pareto) better platform will certainly do so if the others have joined. The penultimate consumer, predicting that the last one will join, will herself join, and the argument unravels to the rst consumer. We adapt their framework to allow for multiple opportunities of migration.
In that same article, Farrell and Saloner also analyze a two player model of incomplete information and demonstrate there can be excessive momentum or inertia. Other authors also use imperfect information to explain incumbency advantage. Choi (1997) assumes that the quality of a technology becomes known to all users as soon as a single user adopts it. There can be less adoption than optimal, because users fear being stranded by themselves once they adopt. Ochs and Park (2010) analyze an environment where a nite number of players dier in how large a platform must be before each individual nds it worthwhile to join. Player types are privately known. There is aggregate uncertainty about the composition of the pool of players who can join the platform at any period and, in equilibrium, they do so sequentially using threshold strategies.
Unlike the above papers, we assume a continuum of users and measurable strategies so that no single user can aect the decisions of the others. Users on the incumbent platform receive multiple stochastic opportunities to migrate.
As in Farrell and Saloner (1985) , adoption can also be inecient in our setting, but the source of this ineciency is not the bandwagon power of early movers.
In a follow up paper, Farrell and Saloner (1986) analyze a dynamic model with network eects with a nite number of consumers who receive a single opportunity to switch according to a Poisson process. They nd that there can be either excessive inertia or excessive momentum relative to the ecient allocation. Our framework with a continuum of players, generalises the switching process to be arbitrary, so we are able to provide a general characterisation of when excess inertia/momentum occur. When excessive adoption arises, it is because we focus on the consumer beliefs which are most favorable to the entrant. Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2005) analyze a model where there is uncertainty regarding the time that a rm can adopt a new standard, and there a free riding eect can induce the non-adoption of a Pareto dominant standard.
By contrast, in this paper, there is uncertainty regarding when each agent will receive her next opportunity to migrate but the adoption decision of an individual agent does not aect other agent's decisions.
Some papers explicitly examine the role of platform behavior in consumer adoption dynamics. Early papers include Katz and Shapiro (1992) , where rms compete in price with entry of new consumers over time. Sakovics and Steiner (2012) study a model where a monopoly platform chooses the order in which to attract users and how much to subsidize each of them. Cabral (2018) studies a model of competition between platforms that adjust their prices dynamically. We abstract from strategic considerations by rms and focuses on user decisions. Moreover, we study circumstances where the order in which users join the platform is potentially based on the distribution of user heterogeneity, rather than chosen directly by a prot maximizing platform. Haªaburda, Jullien and Yehezkel (2018) and Biglaiser and Crémer (2019) allow rms to choose prices to attract consumers, but assume that all consumers make migration decisions after each round of price setting by rms; the consequences of the price dynamics on the migration process is not modeled in these papers.
Finally, in a dierent line of inquiry Gordon, Henry and Murtoz (2018) study the way in which the graph theoretical shape of networks inuence the spread of an innovation in a model with local externalities.
3
Model and equilibrium 3.1 One user choosing when to migrate
We will provide a micro-foundation in 3.2, but for the time being consider the problem of a single user of an incumbent platform I who must decide if and when to migrate to an entrant platform E for simplicity we assume that migration is irreversible.
4 At time t ≥ 0 the utility of the user is u I (t) on the incumbent platform and u E (t) on the entrant platform. Because other users are migrating or because of other factors such as changes in the design of the platform or in prices, the dierence of utility between belonging to one or the other platforms, ∆ u(t) = u E (t)− u I (t), is increasing in t. If there is migration we would expect to generally have ∆ u(0) < 0 and lim t→+∞ ∆ u(t) > 0, but these are not indispensable for the results of this section.
In any interval of time [t, t + dt], the consumer, if she still belongs to the incumbent platform, is given the opportunity to migrate with probability We prefer to think of it as stemming from a psychological (rather than a physical) process where, for instance, consumers think about or are reminded of the existence of the entrant platform at random times. This could be due to advertising by the entrant platform, to word of mouth from other users on the entrant platform, or just to the fact that they suddenly remember that they have heard about the entrant. One could think of consumers as being myopic in the sense of only thinking about migrating when they are given an opportunity in every other dimension, they are fully rational.
A strategy for the consumer is a function φ(t) :
interpreted as the probability that the agent accepts a migration opportunity that arises at time t. The consumer will migrate during a small interval [t, t + dt] if and only if a) she has the opportunity to do so, which happens with probability µ(t) × dt and b) she accepts this opportunity, which she does with probability φ(t). Therefore the probability of migration during the interval is φ(t) × µ(t) × dt. If the agent is on the incumbent at time t, she still is on the incumbent at time t + dt with probability 1 − φ(t) µ(t)dt. Therefore, the probability π(t) that the consumer is on the incumbent at time t satises 
Letting r be the discount rate, the discounted utility of the user is
Since the second term is constant, the user's problem is to choose a strategy φ which maximizes her net discounted utility
The following proposition states that once a user has started to accept migration opportunities with positive probability, then she will accept all future opportunities with probability one. It is a direct consequence of Proposition A.1 which can be found, along with its proof, in appendix A.
Proposition 1. If ∆ u(0) < 0 and lim t→+∞ ∆ u(t) > 0, there exists a unique T < inf{t : ∆ u(t) ≥ 0} which satises either
The user does not migrate before T and accepts all migration opportunities afterwards: φ * (t) = 0 for nearly all t < T , 1 for nearly all t > T .
5 Equation (1) implies
which in turn implies (2) as π(0) = 1
If ∆ u(0) ≥ 0, the user migrates starting at time 0: φ * (t) = 1 for nearly all t. If lim t→+∞ ∆ u ≤ 0, the user never migrates: φ * (t) = 0 for nearly all t.
Once ∆ u(t) > 0, the user will clearly migrate as fast as possible (φ * = 1). It is also intuitive that she will start accepting migration opportunities sometime before ∆ u(t) = 0; if she waited until ∆ u(t) ≥ 0, then she will be on the incumbent platform with probability 1 when the incumbent platform has lower value than the entrant platform. To prove that φ * is equal to 1 once migration has started, one shows that, if it were not the case, she would be better o waiting to start migrating and migrating at a faster rate later. She can do this in a way which increases the (expected) time she spends on the incumbent platform while ∆ u(t) < 0 and at the same time keeping constant the probability that she is on the incumbent platform when ∆ u becomes positive.
One important corollary of Proposition 1 is that there is a unique optimal strategy. As a consequence, similar users will all use the same strategy and we exploit this fact in the equilibrium analysis that follows.
We should add a word of warning: it is tempting to interpret the integral in (3) as the future discounted utility of the user. However, this is an artifact of the exponential function. As the proof in Appendix A makes clear, the exponential in (3) represents the marginal utility.
Many users migrating
Although the results of section 3.1 are valid much more generally, in the reminder of this paper, except in section 7, users are homogenous and anonymous all users have the same utility function and strategies are measurable so that no single user can inuence the migration of others. Also, all consumers in the incumbent at any date t are equally likely to have an opportunity to migrate. At time t = 0, a mass 1 of users are members of the incumbent platform, I, and an entrant platform, E, which has no user becomes available.
If there is a mass h of users on the incumbent and therefore a mass 1 − h on the entrant, the utility of the users of platform I is u I (h, t) and those of platform E is u E (1 − h, t). These utility functions are continuously dierentiable and strictly increasing in their rst arguments, so there are positive network externalities; furthermore, we assume that
is increasing in t for any h.
As does most of the literature on network externalities, we assume that there is no switching cost.
6 The lifetime discounted utility of a user who
The framework is quite exible. For instance, the entry of a new platform in a market where none existed could be represented by assuming u I (h, t) ≡ 0 for all h and all t. Let h(t) be the measure of users on the incumbent platform at time t. As in 3.1, in any interval of time [t, t + dt], each consumer on the incumbent platform is given the opportunity to migrate with probability µ(h(t), t) × dt and migration is irreversible. Therefore, a migration path h(t) is feasible if and only if h(0) = 1 and
By anonymity, individual users cannot aect the aggregate migration path, and will therefore choose a strategy φ(·) to maximize
with π(t) given by (2) with µ(t) replaced by µ(h(t), t). By Proposition 1, all users follow the same strategy φ.
This enables us to dene an equilibrium migration path as a migration path h(t) such that, taking h(·) as given, φ maximizes (4) subject to (2) and such that
Because consumers are ex-ante identical and they follow the same strategy, they all have the same probability of being on the incumbent at any time t.
Because the total mass of consumers is 1, by (2) we have
We can now dene migration equilibria, which are simply equilibrium paths in which there is some migration by a positive mass of consumers.
Denition 1 (Migration equilibria). A migration equilibrium is an equilibrium migration path h(t) where a strictly positive mass of consumers migrate: lim t→+∞ h(t) < 1.
Using Proposition 1 and the denition of migration equilibrium, it is straightforward to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In all migration equilibria all consumers use the same threshold strategy.
In any migration equilibrium, there exists a t 0 such that h(t) = 1 for t ≤ t 0 and h (t) = −µ(h(t), t) h(t) for all t > t 0 .
If µ(h(t), t) is independent of t, then if there exists a migration equilibrium consumers will begin migrating at date 0 except on a set of parameters of measure 0. 7
When µ is independent of time, a migration equilibrium is unique as long as users at t = 0 are not indierent between migrating and not. With time dependence, one would have to impose further conditions on µ to obtain unicity of equilibrium.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 2 and plays an important role in the sequel. It states that a migration equilibrium exists if and only if the rst consumers who are given the opportunity to migrate accept it: the migration incentives of subsequent customers will be stronger, as the utility delivered by the entrant platform increases over time.
Corollary 1. There exists a migration equilibrium if and only if there exists a t 0 such that
If t 0 > 0, condition (5) must be satised as an equality. If µ, u i , u E are independent of t, there exists a migration equilibrium if and only if
with
If condition (7) is strict, all migration equilibria initiate at t = 0.
If there is a migration equilibrium, there must be a time t = t 0 after which every user accepts the rst opportunity to migrate that it obtains. It is at time t 0 that the incentives to migrate are lowest. A user who migrates at time t 0 has a discounted utility equal to
where h(t), as dened by (6), is the mass of users on the incumbent platform if all the others choose to migrate. If she chooses to wait for the next opportunity, given that every customer uses the same strategy, at any time t ≥ t 0 she will be on the incumbent platform with probability h(t) and on the entrant platform with probability 1 − h(t), which yields an expected utility
Condition (5) states that (9) is greater than (10), and hence that users will nd it protable to migrate starting at time t 0 . If (5) is a strict inequality with t 0 > 0, then a user who receives an opportunity to migrate just before t 0 would have strict incentives to accept it.
The proof that (7) is necessary and sucient when the migration process is independent of time is straightforward. Furthermore, if it is a strict inequality, then from (5), all migration equilibria begin at date 0.
It is important to notice that (5) and (7) are only necessary conditions for the existence of migration if they hold migration can occur, but there could be no migration with unfavorable beliefs. As discussed above, we assume that each user believes that other users will accept all migration opportunities.
Migration is guaranteed only if lim t→+∞ u E (0, t) − u I (1, t) > 0: at all times users would rather be alone on the entrant platform than with all the other users on the incumbent platform. In the case of time independence this translates into u E (0) > u I (1). In this case, we say that migration is a dominant strategy because each user would choose to migrate independently of beliefs and of the actions of other users. Similarly, if u E (1) < u I (0), it is a dominant strategy not to migrate.
In order to better able to study the role of incumbency, in the sequel we will restrict our attention to stationary environments.
Assumption 1. In the sequel, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that the environment is stationary with the utilities u I and u E as well as the migration technology µ independent of t.
Also, for notational ease we present the following, which simply restates that the users are following equilibrium migration strategies:
Notation. In the sequel, unless explicitly stated otherwise, h refers to the migration path described by (8) where all users accept the rst opportunity to migrate.
Our main focus is the way in which the migration process prevents migration, not the ineciencies induced by the length of the migration process.
We therefore will focus on the case where r is close to 0 migration does not take much time.
Assumption 2. In the sequel, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume r = 0. More formally, our results are limit results valid when preceded by a when r tends to zero, at the limit: there exists ar such that migration takes place for all r <r.
Linear Utilities
To get a better sense of the determinants of the existence of migration equilibria we will sometimes, but not always, consider linear utilities of the form
The platforms dier in the strength of network eects (b E , b I ) and/or in their stand-alone quality (k E ): without loss of generality, the stand-alone value of the incumbent is normalized to zero. Migration is a dominant strategy if k E > b I , while not migrating is a dominant strategy if k E + b E < 0.
In this setting, Corollary 1 implies that there exists a migration equilibrium if and only if
with h dened by (6) or (8).
The left-hand-side of (12) depends only on the preferences of the users, whereas the right-hand-side depends only on the migration technology. This easily yields some insights on the way in which preferences aect migration.
Notice that because h 2 (t) ≤ h(t) for all t as h(t) ∈ [0, 1], the right hand side of (12) 
Some determinants of incumbency advantage
Turning back to general stationary specications of migration technologies and utility functions, we now study the consequences for incumbency advantage of changes in the speed of the migration process. We rst show that, for low r, speeding up the migration process does not aect the existence of a migration equilibrium. We then show formally that incumbency advantage is increased by the availability of more than one migration opportunity.
8 If the left-hand-side of (12) is greater than 1, then there will be migration for for any migration process h: this occurs when k E > b I and migration is a dominant strategy. If the left-hand-side is negative, individuals will not migrate for any h: this occurs when k E < −b E and not migrating is a dominant strategy.
First, let us consider the eect of speeding up the migration process. Dene acceleration of the migration path h as another migration path h such that h(t) = h(αt) with α > 1. When α is very large, migration is close to instantaneous. The following proposition shows that with small r the acceleration of the migration path does not aect the possibility of migration:
acceleration changes the benets of migrating and the benets of waiting in the same proportion.
Proposition 3. In the limit as r → 0, an acceleration of a migration process does not aect the existence of a migration equilibrium: condition (7) holds, in the limit if and only if it holds for h(t) = h(αt) whatever α.
Proof. Assume that (7) holds for h for all r <r. Let α > 1 and h(t) = h(αt). Then, by the change of variable u = t/α, (7) holds with h replaced by h for all r < αr.
A similar result holds outside of the limit. By a similar change of variables, one can show that if condition (7) holds for a migration process h and discount rate r > 0, it also holds if the process is accelerated to h(t) = h(αt) and the discount rate set to r = αr.
In the introduction and in section 2, we argued that the crucial dierence between our setup and that of Farrell and Saloner (1986) 
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. Whenever there exists a migration equilibrium with multiple migration opportunities, there exist one with a single migration opportunity:
condition (13) holds whenever (7) does.
Proof. Assume that (7) holds and u E (1 − h(0)) < u I (h(0)) (otherwise the result is trivial). There existst such that ∆u(h(t)) = 0 with h(t) > 0.
Because the function h is decreasing we have
and therefore (7) implies (13).
When users have multiple opportunities to migrate, they have incentives to reject early migration opportunities to avoid being on the entrant platform when it has few adopters. The take it or leave it aspect of the oer when there is only one opportunity favors migration.
4
The shape of migration paths
To pursue our inquiry further, it is useful to dene the following notation.
For any functions g, g 1 and g 2 from + into + , dene expectation, variance and covariance under the exponential density r × e −rt , as follows:
9 Equation (14) provides more information on the issue.
Incumbency advantage -linear utilities
With linear utilities there exists a migration equilibrium, when (12) holds.
Using the notation above, this can be rewritten as
. 
Incumbency advantage -general utilities
In this subsection, we extend the analysis of 4.1 to general utility functions while in 4.3 we will discuss the welfare consequences of our analysis. Both of these subsections can be skipped without loss in continuity and the reader can go straight to section 5 where we develop further insights through the study of a family of specic migration functions.
Using the notation developed at the beginning of this section, we can rewrite (7) as
where the second inequality is a consequence of the fact that h is a decreasing function of t while ∆u is increasing.
Equation ( 
Welfare
We now examine whether the equilibrium that we focus on, the migration equilibrium, generates the maximal social surplus.
Proposition 5. Migration increases welfare if and only if
In the limit as r → 0, migration increases welfare if u E (1) > u I (1), and decreases welfare when u E (1) < u I (1). 10 10 Formally, there exists an r such that (15) holds with a strict inequality for all r ≤ r.
Proof. Welfare from migration is
Welfare without migrating is ∞ 0 u I (1) e −rt dt = u I (1) /r. In the limit as r → 0, all the welfare loss during the transition is unimportant relative to the long term benets of the new platform.
From Corollary 1, there exists a migration equilibrium if
while from Proposition 5, migration is ecient if
It is straightforward to show that any permutation of either (16) or (17) can hold. This leads to the following remark.
Remark. In a migration equilibrium, there can be either excessive inertia or excessive migration.
We have focused on the free rider problem faced by users. This is why there can be too little migration. Perhaps counter-intuitively, there can be too much migration relative to the social maximizing level of no migration.
Recall, we are choosing the equilibrium where consumers' beliefs are that other consumers are going to migrate and a consumer is not concerned about being left behind.
Autonomous vs. Word of Mouth migration
We now specialize the model and assume that the migration technology is a mixture of two two easily interpretable basic technologies. We think of the rst technology as stemming from something like advertising or, more generally, one to many forms of communications: the frequency at which users see advertisements or other form of information, and hence are reminded of the presence of the entrant platform is constant over time. More formally, during any small interval of time of length dt every user on the incumbent platform has a probability s × dt of being given the opportunity to migrate.
We call this the autonomous migration technology which is independent of both h(t) and t.
11
In the second technology, word of mouth, users learn about the new platform via pairwise meetings with other users who have already migrated.
Formally, in an interval of time of length dt, any user meets another user with probability a × dt. Assuming every pair of meetings is equally probable, each user on the incumbent platform has a probability a × (1 − h(t)) × dt of meeting a user who belongs to the entrant platform.
In the case of programmers potentially aected by a degradation of the quality of GitHub, we think that users would learn about alternative platforms from on line news sources or bulletin boards. The migration technology would be closer to autonomous than to word of mouth.
We combine these two processes into the migration technology
where σ = (s + a)/a ∈ (1, +∞). The parameter σ > 1 captures the relative importance of s, the autonomous component of the migration technology. As σ → 1, word of mouth becomes dominant. 13 As σ → ∞, the autonomous component dominates.
Since µ does not directly depend on t, any migration equilibrium has threshold t 0 = 0 (Corollary 1). All migration opportunities are accepted hence, along a migration path, h (t) = −µ(h(t)) × h(t). Turning back to the linear case, the right hand side of (12) becomes
which is decreasing in σ, as illustrated in Figure 3 and shown in appendix B.2. Therefore, the set of parameters (k E , b E , b I ) for which a migration equilibrium exists becomes larger as σ increases, i.e. as the autonomous component of migration becomes relatively more prominent.
As σ → 1, the word of mouth component of the the migration technology dominates and the right hand side of (12) converges to 1. In this case, 14 (18) implies h(0) = 1 and
)e σat h(t) = −a(σ − h(t))h(t).
a migration equilibrium exists only when migration is a dominant strategy k E ≥ b I ). Since migration is ecient whenever k E + b E > b I , there will exist regions of the parameters space migration is socially desirable but no migration equilibrium exists. Intuitively, with σ ≈ 1, migration relies almost entirely on word of mouth which, given the initial condition of no participation in the entrant platform, will leave early migrants receiving very low network externalities. We would expect, although this would require formal analysis, that in this setting, an entrant has incentives to jump start the market by engaging in activities which increase σ such as advertising.
At the other extreme, as σ → ∞ the word of mouth component vanishes and the right hand side of (12) converges to 1/2. This is illustrated in Other determinants of incumbency advantage
Our basic model can be extended in a number of ways to explore how the environment inuences incumbency advantages. First, it is natural to assume that once users are aware of a new platform for the rst time, they may think about migrating more often. We show that this will increase incumbency advantage. Second, we show that incumbency advantage decreases when, possibly for strategic reasons, the entrant has limited capacity and cannot accommodate all possible users. Finally, we show that multi-homing decreases, but does not eliminate, incumbency advantage.
Finally, a technical warning: because we adapt the basic framework, to
The cuto (b E + k E )/(b E + b I ) as a function of σ, as described in (19) . Notice that the function converges to 1 as σ → 1.
be totally rigorous we would have to update the basic theory of sections 3.1 and 3.2. We will spare the reader this ordeal, and simply determine under which circumstances the rst user, given the opportunity to migrate, will choose to do so.
Two speeds
It seems reasonable that a user of the incumbent platform who has refused migration will think more often of the possibility of migrating than a user who has not yet been made aware of the existence of an alternative. We show that, with a reasonable added assumption, this increases incumbency advantage.
We begin by making the extreme assumption that users who have refused their rst migration opportunity continuously keep in mind the possibility of moving, and therefore can decide to migrate instantly at any subsequent time.
Alternatively, and equivalently, they compute the best time to migrate and set an alarm to remind themselves to do so. Then, there can be no migration starting at time 0 unless migrating is a dominant strategy. A user oered the opportunity to move at time 0 would be better o waiting until time t * where enough users have migrated such that the (instantaneous) utilities on both platforms are equal.
On the other hand, there exist other delayed migration equilibria. On the assumptions that a) eventually all users learn about the existence of the entrant and that b) the entrant is indeed superior to the incumbent, for t * large enough, the users who have learned about the existence of the entrant by that time would be better o, collectively and individually, if they migrated simultaneously. Therefore, there exists a continuum of equilibria indexed by large ts such that all users who have learned about the existence of the entrant platform by time t migrate at that time, and all the users who learn about its existence later migrate as soon as they can.
In the rest of this section, we assume that the entrant platform cannot survive if it has no clients for any interval of time, so that migration must begin at t = 0 or not at all. We discuss this hypothesis further below.
Proposition 6. If consumers are able to migrate at any time after their rst migration opportunity, a migration equilibrium only exists if migration is a dominant strategy, i.e., if u E (0) > u I (1).
To study what happens when subsequent opportunities arrive faster than the rst rather than continuously, assume the basic migration technology is autonomous, but that after their rst opportunity to migrate users of the incumbent platform receive additional opportunities following an accelerated autonomous process µ(h) = αs for all h. We generally expect α > 1, but the derivations are valid for any α. With linear utilities, a user who migrates at time 0 and expects others to follow obtains a benet of: 
As we saw at the end of Section 5, with r = 0, a standard autonomous migration technology (α = 1), and b E = b I = b, there is no incumbency advantage: migration occurs if and only if it is optimal, i.e., when k E ≥ 0. More generally, whatever r, the right hand side of (20) captures the incumbency advantage in this setting; it is increasing in α. When α = 0, users act if they can migrate only once and therefore incumbency advantage is small, as described in Proposition 4. When α = 1 we obtain the same result as with the standard autonomous migration technology. As α → ∞, migration only occurs if it is a dominant strategy, as in Proposition 6.
If the incumbent platform remained available even though early users do not migrate, an equilibrium with delayed migration would exist. Intuitively, as time goes by and more consumers have had a rst opportunity to migrate, the population of users becomes closer and closer to an homogeneous population of users with migration technology µ = αs. Therefore, migration takes place as in the fully autonomous technology and incumbency advantage vanishes. These results on possible delayed migration suggests that entrant platforms may have to plan enough capital to wait out an initial period of low adoption. More research on the topic might be of both theoretical and practical interest.
Capacity constraints
So far we have assumed that the entrant has the capacity to service all users.
In this section we assume instead that the entrant has a maximum capacity of 1 − κ < 1 and show that the fear of being left behind on the incumbent platform increases consumers incentives to migrate. Thus, it could be in an entrant's best interest to reduce its capacity in order to kick start migration.
The capacity constraint stops migration at time T such that 1 − h(T ) = 1 − κ (we are assuming that lim t→+∞ h(t) = 0). Then, by the same reasoning that leads to (4), the utility of a user who does not migrate at time 0 is
Comparing this to her utility if she migrated,
we see that the test for the existence of a migration equilibrium is changed from (7) to
Assuming ∆u(0) > 0, the derivative of h∆u(h) for h = 0 is positive. Hence for κ small enough and therefore T large enough κ∆u(κ) > h(t)∆u(h(t)) and (21) is easier to satisfy than (7). In the linear case (see (11)), this yields the following proposition (generalizations are straightforward).
Proposition 8. With linear utilities, a small reduction in capacity by the entrant reduces incumbency advantage: the minimum quality advantage k * E of the entrant required for migration is decreasing in the reduction of capacity κ at κ = 0.
This proves that an entrant might be able to pump migration by committing, if it can, to accept only a limited number of users.
Multi-homing
It is common for users to participate in multiple platforms at the same time.
We want to understand whether the free rider eect is still present when we allow for multi-homing.
Suppose that once a user receives a migration opportunity, she has three options: a) continue single-homing on the incumbent; b) multi-home on both platforms; or c) single-home on the entrant. We also allow a multi-homing user to switch to single-homing on the entrant platform.
17
Let the utility of a consumer single-homing on platforms I or E be u I (h(t)) = u(h(t)) and u E (1 − h(t)) = u(1 − h(t)) + k E , respectively. A multi-homing user is connected to all other consumers, so her net benets are:
A multi-homing user is connected to a mass 1 of consumers and therefore obtains utility u (1), in addition to the entrant platform's utility advantage k E . We assume that multi-homing also imposes a cost c > 0. This cost can reect either the fact that a consumer must divide her limited time between the two platforms, or that there is some loss of enjoyment by multitasking on both platforms.
18 We assume that c is small enough that it is worthwhile paying it when h = 1:
Consumers prefer multi-homing to single-homing if
The left-hand-side is monotonically decreasing in t and positive at t = 0 by assumption. Therefore, there exists at such that the inequality holds for t ∈ [0,t], and it is reversed for t >t. Multi-homing is preferred early on, while there is still a signicant mass of users only reachable through the incumbent platform (t ∈ [0,t]). Once a sucient mass of users is multi-homing, the advantage of being connected to the incumbent platform becomes lower than the cost of multi-homing. At that point (t =t), users choose to single-home in the entrant.
Multi-homing increases the utility of a user who migrates at t = 0, by
17 Consistent with our assumption that, once a user goes to an entrant, she cannot go back to the incumbent, we assume that once she is multi-homing, she cannot return to single-homing on the incumbent.
18 An alternative assumption would be that multi-homing brings only part of the stand alone benets of belonging to the entrant platform, so that (22) would read u M = b + αk E − c, with α ∈ (0, 1). This would lead to similar results as having the multi-homing cost beĉ = c
The additional benet of delaying migration at date t = 0 with the possibility of migrating at a future date and multi-homing if the date is less thant is
Since for t ∈ [0,t], we have u(1) − u (1 − h(t)) − c ≥ 0 and 1 − h(t) < 1, at time 0 a user gains more from migration when she can multihome.
As mentioned in the introduction, in a report written for the European Commission, Crémer et al. (2019) argue that dominant rms should be asked to justify the use of policies that deter multi-homing. This proposal was made on the basis of an intuition similar to that of this section: multi-homing is a way by which incumbency advantage can be decreased, and a dominant rm should discourage it only when this has clear pro-competitive consequences, as it sometimes do.
Heterogeneous users
Till now, we have assumed that all users share the same preferences. We now allow for user heterogeneity and study its eect on incumbency advantage.
Our main takeaways are that: 1) equilibria can have delayed or, ineciently, no migration by one group of users and 2) users split across dierent platforms more than is ecient.
We assume that the utility in the incumbent platform is u I (h) = bh for all users. Utility in the entrant platform is u
and for the remaining mass p L = 1 − p H of reluctant users. Migration opportunities arise solely based on the autonomous process, so µ(h) = s for all h with s > 0. There is no discounting: r = 0.
A complete description of all the migration paths would not bring much.
Rather, for every set of parameters, we identify the equilibria in which the greatest number of users migrate and do so as early as possible let us call this equilibria maximal migration equilibria. (We comment further on this assumption below.) In all such equilibria where some users migrate, eager users accept migration opportunities for all t ≥ 0, and, if they migrate, reluctant users accept all migration opportunities for t greater than equal to 
Then the following proposition, illustrated on Figure 4 holds.
Proposition 9. The maximal migration equilibria are as follows:
• If and only if both types strictly prefer the entrant platform to the incumbent platform, k H > k L ≥ 0, in the maximal migration equilibrium users of both types migrate at the rst opportunity starting at time 0.
• If and only if k H ≥ −(1 − p H )k L /p H and −bp H < k L < 0, the maximal migration equilibrium is a staggered equilibrium where eager users migrate at the rst opportunity and reluctant users at the rst opportunity starting at time T L dened by
i.e., when they derive the same utility migrating immediately or waiting for the next opportunity.
• If and only if k H > (1 − p H )b and k L ≤ −bp H , the maximal migration equilibrium is a segregated equilibrium where eager users migrate at the rst opportunity starting at time 0 and reluctant users never migrate.
• In all other cases, there exist no migration in any equilibrium.
For reasons which are similar to those discussed after Corollary 2, migration of eager types will start at time 0 and in any staggered equilibrium the migration of reluctant types will start at T L .
Proof of Proposition 9. If k H > 0 and it is expected that all users will migrate, by the same reasoning as in the case of homogenous users in the autonomous case, eager users will nd it optimal to migrate starting at time 0.
If k L ≥ 0, for any t > 0, the entrant platform will provide a higher utility to the reluctant users, who, by the same reasoning, will nd it optimal to migrate if the other reluctant users do.
If k L < 0, the date T L at which the reluctant consumers start to migrate, if they do so, is such that the net benet from migrating at that time is 0. The value of T L is computed in Lemma C.1 in Appendix C while the identication of the staggered and segregated equilibria are conducted in Lemma C.2.
Notice that, as we would expect from the analysis of the autonomous migration technology in the one type case, in the segregated equilibrium, when consumers end up on dierent platforms, eager users migrate if and only if it is ecient for them to do so given that the reluctant users are not migrating, i.e., if the quality benet of the entrant platform is greater than the loss of the externality benets stemming from the absence of the reluctant users.
We now discuss the relationship between equilibrium and eciency in the two type model. Since we are considering the limit as r → 0, welfare lost during the migration process itself is ignored. Therefore, welfare is
This implies that the welfare maximizing migration is described as follows, 
(27) Figure 5 illustrates (27) and contrasts socially optimal behaviour with the equilibrium behaviour described in Proposition 9. The three green shaded areas in the gure illustrate regions of the parameter space when a migration equilibrium exists and it is the welfare maximising outcome. First, if k L is not too negative and k H is large, there is a migration equilibrium where both types migrate. This is the optimal outcome since the mild preference for the incumbent of types k L is not enough to justify the loss in network externalities that would result from segregation.
19 Second, if k L is very negative and k H is not very large, a migration equilibrium does not exist. Migration is not socially desirable because preferences are, overall, in favor of the incumbent and the mild preferences of types k H are not enough to justify segregation. Third, if k L is very negative and k H is very positive, there exists a migration equilibrium where only types k H migrate. This is socially optimal because each type has an extreme preference for a dierent platform.
In the red regions of the gure, ineciencies may occur. The ineciency is always due to excessive segregation; that is, types k H migrate and types k L do not, but it would be optimal for all users to be in the same platform since this maximises network externalities. If k L is more extreme than k H , the socially optimal outcome is for all types to remain in the incumbent platform.
If k H is more extreme than k L , it is optimal for all users to migrate. Excessive migration arises because each user's decision does not take into account the externalities that it generates towards other users.
We have studied the consequences of a dierence in evaluation of the stand alone values of the platforms between the two groups of consumers.
It would be of interest to understand the consequences of dierence in the strength of network externalities parameters, in the spirit of Biglaiser and Crémer (2019) . It would also be of interest to understand the consequences of dierent migration technologies between two groups of users (we indirectly touched on the topic at the end of section 6.1).
19 Migration is staggered but since we are considering the limit as r → 0, this delay does not aect overall welfare. Equilibria and welfare with 2 types of users. The legend should be read as follows. E and W indicate respectively the Equilibrium and Social welfare maximising congurations. For instance, the rst line shows that, for the relevant conguration of parameters, only the k H type consumers migrate whereas it would be socially optimal not to have any migration at all. The bottom line indicates that, in equilibrium, type k H consumers migrate to the entrant platform while type k L consumers stay on the incumbent platform, which is socially optimal. We have assumed that only consumers act strategically, but that platforms do not. This was done to focus on how the migration process aected 20 This is a very simplied description of the model. Actually each agent exerts a (exogenous) weight on the decision by his neighbors to imitate this adoption of the innovation.
An agent adopts the innovation is the sum of these weights for his neighbors who have accepted the innovation is large enough.
consumers' incentive to migrate. Our framework can be used as a building block to analyze models where rms can act strategically. There are many ways to endogenize competition among platforms. One would be for the entrant to choose quality of a platform. This would be natural in many settings with network externalities for rms to compete in quality and not prices, such as social media platforms where platform revenues are generated through advertising. If this does not aect a consumers' migration opportunities, then clearly the entrant would choose the minimum quality level that induces early consumers to migrate.
Another direction is to allow each platform to choose prices. If prices are chosen once and for all, then there would be Bertrand competition between the two platforms where the rst consumers would be indierent between migrating and not and the losing platform could not lower its price without making loses overall. When platforms can price dynamically, then one of the interesting issues that arises is whether rms' prices depend on whether the consumer is currently using its platform or not; that is, whether it uses history dependent prices. If the platforms can use history dependent prices, then it will not have to take into account how its price for new consumers aects its revenue from its current base. If history dependent prices cannot be implemented, then the platforms will take into account how a price reduction increases its consumer base while reducing revenues on its current consumer base. This issue is also present in the switching cost literature.
Another possible direction for future research is to study the ways in which platforms can aect the migration opportunities of consumers. For example, rms can choose the rate that consumers see an advertisement for a new platform there could be interesting links to the marketing literature.
Proof. Because v is decreasing, v(t) < 0 for all t ≥ T .
Assume that we did not have φ * (t) = 1 for nearly all t ≥ T . For any t in some interval [t 1 , t 2 ] with T ≤ t 1 < t 2 we would have φ * (t) < 1. Let φ(t) = φ * (t) for t ≤ T and equal to 1 for t > T . Then, π(t; φ) = π(t; φ * ) for t ≤ T , π(t; φ) ≤ π(t; φ * ) for t ≥ T and π(t; φ) < π(t; φ * ) for t > t Let φ(t) = φ * (t) for t ≤ T 0 and to 1 for t > T 0 . Clearly, π(t; π) = π(t; π * )
for t ≤ T 0 . For t > T 0 , we have
which implies, because g is decreasing, π(t; φ) ≤ π(t; π * ) with a strict inequality if φ * (t) is not nearly always equal to 1 for τ ∈ (T 0 , t). We now compute +∞ 0 h 2 (t) dt. Note that h (t) = −µ(h(t)) × h(t) implies h 2 (t) = h (t)/a + σh(t) and therefore B.2 The right hand side of (19) is decreasing in σ
The derivative of the right hand side of (19) with respect to σ is 1 + 1 σ − 1 σ − 1 (ln σ − ln(σ − 1)) 2 = 1 − 1 σ(σ − 1)(ln σ − ln(σ − 1)) 2 > 0, where the inequality is a consequence of the fact that, by strict concavity of the function ln, we have ln σ − ln(σ − 1) < ∂ ln ∂σ σ=σ−1 × (σ − (σ − 1)) = 1 σ − 1 .
C Heterogeneous Types
The two lemmas in this appendix assume the hypotheses of Section 7.
Lemma C.1. If eager users begin migrating at time 0 and reluctant users begin migrating at time t ≥ T L > 0, T L satises (26).
Proof. Under the hypotheses of the lemma, for t ≥ T L , a reluctant user is on the incumbent platform with probability e −s(t−T L ) . Setting r = 0 migrating at time T L yields a greater utility than waiting for the next opportunity if Proof. An eager user will migrate at time 0 rather than wait for the next opportunity if
which, using (25) and (26) is equivalent to
which, by(26), is equivalent to k H /b ≥ (1−p H )(1−e −sT L ) = −(1−p H )k L /(bp H ).
This completes the proof for the case T L < +∞.
The result for T L = +∞ follows trivially. It is equivalent to the fact that for purely autonomous migration technology and r = 0, migration takes place if and only if it is ecient.
